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Abstract: 
The fast growing market for smart phones coupled with their almost 
continuous online presence makes these devices the new targets of virus 
writers. It has been recently found that the topological spread of MMS 
(Multimedia Message Services) viruses is highly restricted by the underlying 
fragmentation of the call graph. In this paper, we study MMS viruses under 
another type of spreading behavior: scanning. We find that hybrid MMS 
viruses including some level of scanning are more dangerous to the mobile 
community than their standard topological counterparts. However, the 
effectiveness of both scanning and topological behaviors in MMS viruses can 
generally be limited by two controlling methods: (i) decreasing susceptible 
handsets’ market share (OS it runs) and (ii) improving monitoring capacity to 
limit the frequency in which MMS messages can be sent by the mobile viruses. 
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1. Introduction: 
The history of technological viruses is intrinsically linked to the history of 
computational devices. Since the inception of the Internet, programmers began 
writing self-replicating executables such as Creeper [1], the first known instance of 
a computer virus. From there on, the field of computer security grew together with 
the ability of programmers to write increasingly more sophisticated viruses. In 
recent years, mobile phones have become the new frontier for these self-replicating 
programs [2-7]. The availability of these mobile devices coupled with their 
continuous online presence makes them an ideal breeding ground for technological 
viruses [2-7]. 
Mobile phone viruses spread primarily through Bluetooth and MMS 
connections [2-7]. While a Bluetooth virus can reach the full susceptible user base, 
its spread is slowed by human mobility [8, 9], offering ample time for developing 
and deploying countermeasures [10]; Bluetooth communication has a short range 
and as users move away from each other the communication channel between the 
devices may be lost. In contrast, MMS viruses use a topological spreading 
approach unrestricted by user movement and can reach most susceptible users 
within hours of the initial attack [10]. However, their spread is limited by the 
market share of the OS (Operating System) they run which leads to a 
fragmentation of the underlying call graph [11, 12] making it hard for a virus to 
cover the entire graph. In this paper, we study MMS viruses under the assumption 
that viruses are able to scan for numbers in the call graph; what we call scanning 
spreading approach.  
Scanning is a simple form of viral behavior. It implies the use of Pseudo-
Random Number Generators (PRNGs) to select a target within the population of 
handsets. Once the target number is selected, the virus sends a copy of itself to that 
target via MMS. The mobile-phone world has seen instances of this behavior such 
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as the Timofonica virus [13] and more recently in a hybrid virus called Beselo [14]. 
At the first glance, random scans seem to be a naïve approach but what makes 
them dangerous is that a few successful scans may transfer the infection from one 
side of the network to another in a very short amount of time. Figure 1 depicts the 
approaches of topology vs. scanning. Note that part of the network (depicted in 
light yellow) could never be reached without scans. This example demonstrates the 
difference between topological viruses (which have to respect the existing 
connections between users) and scanning viruses (which are able to jump from 
user to user in the network). Below the phase transition point [15-20] of OS market 
share, no giant component exists in the network [10, 15-20], however, scanning 
links change the network topology, making the giant component exist even market 
share is under the phase transition point. 
 
 
Figure 1. We can observe that scans are independent of the topology 
of the network. In other words, the topology formed by users having 
other users’ numbers in their phone books is not used for the scans (in 
dashed line).  
ADDRESS BOOK LINKS
SCANS TO RANDOM NUMBERS
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2. Dataset and Methodology: 
 
2.1 MMS usage pattern 
The dataset used in this paper was collected by a mobile phone operator for 
billing and operational purposes during 12 weeks period. The privacy of all callers 
is ensured through the use of a security key (hash code) for each user instead of 
users’ real phone numbers. 
We start our study with an analysis of the use of MMS as form of 
communication. Figure 2 shows the result of such analysis for the MMS activity of 
approximately 6 million mobile-phone users over a period of 12 weeks with an 
average volume of 4.7 million messages per week. The figure shows periodic 
usages of MMS peaking from Sunday to Tuesday. This pattern is widely used by 
phone operators to protect communication system by monitoring abnormal MMS 
activities [5, 12]. Moreover, in our simulations we assume that mobile phone 
operators are able to use the global activity patterns to check for anomalies that 
may arise from big fluctuations in individuals’ MMS activity. In the insert of 
Figure 2, we measure the maximum and average MMS volume in different two-
hour periods for a week (Figure 2a). If the MMS volume generated by the spread 
of viruses is larger than the volume difference, ΔV, between the maximum and 
average MMS volume (Figure 2b), phone operators are able to detect the viruses 
using simple anomaly detection approaches, otherwise, MMS viruses may spread 
without being detected (phone operators generally regard these slightly higher rates 
of messages as part of expected fluctuations in users’ MMS usage [12]). 
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Figure 2. The insert (a) shows the maximum and average MMS 
volumes calculated from 12 weeks' mobile phone data. The difference 
between the two volumes, ΔV, is shown in (b) and is used as a 
threshold of MMS viruses being detected by phone operators. 
 
2.2 SI Model and the topological and scanning approaches of MMS viruses 
We use the SI model [21] to simulate the spread of MMS viruses. Under this 
model,  mobile phones can be in only one of two possible states: infected (I), when 
they are transmitting the infection, or susceptible (S), when they are vulnerable to 
infections. In our simulations we are interested in the initial spreading process in 
the absence of recovery or antiviral software, so we do not consider the possibility 
that the phones could recover from the infection, a reasonable assumption due to 
the limited capacity of some handsets for installing antiviral software [3-5], 
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combined with the users’ current lack of concern about the threat of mobile phone 
viruses [3-5]. Although many mobile phone viruses require user confirmation to 
install (disguised as a photo or a music file) [3-5], in our simulations we assume 
that the virus does not need a user confirmation, corresponding to the worst 
possible spreading scenario. 
 
In a standard SI model an infected mobile phone can infect a susceptible 
phone at a rate μ described by 
S + I 2I

                                          (1) 
Thus the number of infected users (I) evolves in time as 
/
dI
SI N
dt

                                                                            (2) 
We define the effective infection rate as β=μ<k>, where μ=1/τ is the virus’s 
infection rate, or the inverse of τ (the time it takes for the virus to infect a 
susceptible handset) multiplied by <k> which represents the average number of 
contacts in a typical user’s address book. In this paper, we study two spreading 
approaches of MMS viruses: in a topological spread the infected handset sends out 
malicious MMS to the phone numbers listed in its address book; and scanning 
spread where the handset sends out malicious MMS to random generated phone 
numbers.  
In the topological approach, we approximate a user’s address book with the 
list of numbers the user communicated with during one month of observation. In 
the simulation, we assign the initial virus to a randomly chosen handset in the 
network, which in turn will send infected MMSs to all its identified contacts. The 
MMS service is not instantaneous – there is some time delay on receiving a MMS. 
In our simulation we choose τ=2 minutes as the time required for a MMS virus to 
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be received by another handset and to install itself [22]. We choose each 
simulation time step as 2 minutes, and set μ=1 and <k>=1. That is, once infected a 
mobile phone may infect all of its contacts.  
For the scanning approach, we define the effective scanning probability p as 
the probability for scans reaching active phone numbers. To estimate this 
probability, we divided 6 million (an approximation of the mobile phone user base) 
by 100 million (the total phone numbers that 8 digits can generate), obtaining an 
effective scanning probability p=0.06. We further postulate a higher probability 
p=0.25 to study the scenario that viruses improve their scanning ability to reach 
more active phone numbers. 
To quantify the topological/scanning approach level in the spread of MMS 
viruses, we define the random attack probability, ρ, that a virus will attack a 
random phone number rather than a number listed in the address book. Its value 
varies from zero to one, representing viruses’ different attack strategies. For 
example, ρ=0 means pure topological attack strategy and ρ=1 means pure scanning 
attack strategy. 
Viruses generally limit and control their attack times to prevent them being 
detected from the abnormal MMS volume they caused. Hence, we define the 
maximum attack number s for each infected handset, which is the total number of 
viral MMSs that an infected phone can send.   
 
2.3 The naïve and temporal spread model 
In this paper, we study two spreading models: naïve and temporal. The 
difference between them is on their ability of utilizing temporal patterns of MMS 
volume to prevent being detected. With the information about MMS volume 
during a day, the temporal spread model aims at understanding viruses that try to 
avoid detection by phone providers. On the other hand, the naïve model is studied 
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to understand the worst-case scenario of a viral outbreak, ignoring MMS temporal 
usage patterns and possible monitoring by phone operators. Without loss of 
generality, we use OS market share values of m=0.30 and m=0.03 to study the viral 
spread in different types of call graphs [11, 12]. When the market share m=0.30 
there is a giant component in the call graph and in the small m=0.03 case no giant 
component exists and call graph is fragmented into small isolated clusters. 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
 
3.1 The effect of scanning 
We start by looking at the effect of topological and random attacks on a real 
call graph. We study a small neighborhood of the call graph (~600 nodes) 
generated by starting from a randomly chosen user and including all mobile phone 
contacts up distance 4 from it. The nodes in Figure 3a are represented using two 
colors that correspond to the two kinds of OSs with 25% and 75% market share 
respectively. A virus infects only the OS it was designed for, thus the largest 
components [15-20] formed by the same color connected nodes represent the 
maximum number of handsets that a virus can infect. Without random scans, the 
red nodes distribute in small islands and the largest component size represents only 
6% of the total number of red nodes (see Figure 3b). If random scanning links are 
added (see the dashed lines in Figure 3c), one can see that the structure of the call 
graph changes significantly, the largest component size is about 6 times bigger, 
revealing that the addition of scanning links makes the virus more dangerous. 
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Figure 3. (a) A small neighborhood of the call graph is generated by 
starting from a randomly chosen mobile phone user and including all 
mobile phone contacts up distance 4 from it. The two colors used in 
the nodes represent two kinds of OSs with 25% and 75% market share 
respectively. (b) Without the random scans, the red nodes distribute in 
small islands; the largest component size represents only 6% of the 
total number of red nodes. (c) With random scans, small isolated 
clusters are connected, forming larger clusters (the dash lines 
represent the connections created by random scans); the size of the 
largest component increases to 35% of the total number of red nodes. 
 
3.2  Naïve Viral Spread Model  (Worst Case Study) 
In the naïve viral spread model, the viral spread is added uniformly on top of 
the normal daily MMS activity. This model studies the worst-case of a virus spread, 
since it looks at the epidemics under the assumption that no protection or detection 
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mechanisms are in place. We measured the infection fraction (I/N, the total number 
of infected users over the total susceptible user base) for different epidemic 
scenarios of m (market share), s (maximum attack number), p (effective-scanning 
probability) and ρ (random-attack probability). For each case, we run ten 
independent simulations with the virus starting at randomly chosen users.  
Intuitively, one can see the different characteristics of topological and 
scanning approaches. Topological attacks always reach active phone numbers but 
they are generally trapped in isolated clusters of the underlying fragmented call 
graph. In contrast, scanning attacks have a much lower possibility to reach active 
phone numbers, but just a few of them can link the isolated clusters together. In 
Figures 4a & 4b we find that for a small market share m=0.03, a relatively big 
random attack probability ρ can connect the fragmented call graph, making MMS 
viruses infect more susceptible handsets. This can be explained by scanning attacks’ 
ability to connect isolated clusters. However, pure scanning attacks (ρ=1) may 
result in the failure of spread due to its low probability to reach active phone 
numbers. For a large market share m=0.3, interestingly, the most threatening attack 
strategy is related to the maximum attack number s. As depicted in Figure 4c, 
when the maximum attack number s is small, MMS viruses with more topological 
attacks will cause more damages because scanning attacks have a low ability to 
reach active phone numbers. If the maximum attack number s is big (s=50), we 
find that MMS viruses with a random attack probability ρ~0.7 are the most 
dangerous, because topological attacks will be ineffective if repeating to attack 
same infected phones iteratively. Hence, we conclude here that some attack 
strategies can increase the danger posed by MMS viruses.  
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Figure 4. The spread using the naïve viral spread model. The solid 
and dashed lines represent the average (solid line), maximum (dashed 
line) and minimum (dashed line) infection fraction (I/N) respectively. 
Parameter m is the market share and parameter p is the effective scan 
probability. Different colors of lines and symbols correspond to 
different maximum attack numbers s=100 (blue), s=500 (green), 
s=1000 (red) for market share m=0.03; and s=10 (blue), s=50 (green), 
s=100 (red) for market share m=0.3. All of the results are from 10 
simulations where the virus starts at a randomly chosen mobile-phone 
user.  
 
12 
 
Following the approach in [10], we study how the market share m influences 
the spread of MMS viruses. We set maximum attack number s at different values, 
from 10 to 1000. For a small market share m=0.03, independently of what attack 
strategies (ρ value) the viruses utilize, they cannot spread if s is smaller than 100. 
In contrast, for a large market share m=0.30, there is a giant component formed 
even when the maximum attack number s is as small as 10. Therefore, large market 
share handsets are much more vulnerable than their smaller counterparts. This 
strengthens the results in [10], revealing again the crucial role of OS market share 
in the spread of mobile phone viruses.  
Next, we explore the function of maximum attack number s in the spread of 
MMS viruses. In Figures 4a and 4b, as we increase this number from 100 to 1000, 
the virus can infect more than 70% of the susceptible user base. Similar results are 
found in Figures 4c and 4d, the infection fraction (I/N) grows quickly as s increases 
from 10 to 50. Hence, besides market share m, the maximum attack number s also 
plays a key role in the spreading process. This finding provides us an effective way 
to defend MMS viruses: if we successfully constrain viruses’ maximum attack 
number s, our communication system can be safe independent of what attack 
strategies viruses use.  
 We also find that the larger the scan effective probability p is, the more 
danger the virus poses. However, comparing with the functions of market share 
and maximum attack number in the spread, its contribution is not so prominent.  
From the analysis above, we discover the conditions that lead to the 
successful spread of MMS viruses. On the other hand, we find crucial elements to 
stop or prevent a viral outbreak. At time of writing, we are not familiar with a virus 
strategy based on the value of ρ (random attack probability). However, based on 
our findings we can force viruses’ attack strategies to fail. Phone operators and 
anti-viral software companies could decrease susceptible phones’ market share m 
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by adding protections to more phones. They could also improve their monitoring 
capacity, detecting MMS viruses earlier and forcing viruses to limit their 
maximum attack number s. The limitation of viruses’ maximum attack number can 
significantly slow down the spread of MMS viruses, driving them to vanish after a 
few iterations (infections).  
The results above provide an indication of the values for market share as 
well as maximum attack number in which the mobile-phone base becomes 
susceptible to global epidemics. Unfortunately however this is not the entire story 
as viruses are being written to be more stealth to detection. In the next section we 
delve into a spread mode that attempts to be stealth by using the patterns in MMS 
volume on different times of the day and different days of the week. 
 
3.2 Temporal Volume-based Viral Spread Mode (The Danger of Being Stealth) 
Given that the pattern of MMS virus can be analyzed, a MMS virus may 
utilize latent periods of usage to avoid detection by the phone operators. One of the 
common ways virus can do the above is by using an approach based on the time of 
the day and day of the week, as well as limiting each infected phone’s maximum 
attack number. In the model proposed here, MMS viruses spread solely during the 
daytime according to the temporal MMS volume pattern and with each infected 
phone’s maximum attack number s and average attack period T being set. For 
example, if 2% of the weekly MMS volume is generated between 6:00pm to 
8:00pm on Tuesday and each infected phone sends out one viral MMS on average 
per day (T=1 day), we calculate the probability of the infected phone sending out a 
viral message in each 2 minutes [22] simulation step as following: 
(1)  Since the average attack period is T=1 day, an infected handset would send 
out seven viral MMSs per week. 
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(2)  Between 6:00pm to 8:00pm on Tuesday, two percent of the total weekly 
MMS volume is generated, thus the infected handset has a probability of 
7*0.02=0.14 to send out a viral MMS between 6:00pm to 8:00pm on 
Tuesday. 
(3)  Between 6:00pm to 8:00pm, there are sixty two-minutes time steps, thus we 
get that the infected handset has a probability of 7×0.02/60=0.0023 to send 
out a viral MMS in each two-minutes during 6:00pm to 8:00pm. 
 
 
Figure 5. The final ratio of infected and susceptible handsets (I/N) in 
one year observational period and the giant component size Gm in 
m=0.03 case. As we set the MMS viruses’ attack period as T=2 hours, 
the ratio of infected handsets is usually smaller than the giant 
component size Gm due to the slow spreading mechanism.  
 
15 
 
First we study the spread under different average attack periods T. That is, 
we calculate the ratio of infected and susceptible handsets (I/N) for different 
average attack periods T, finding that large attack period (low attack frequency) 
can make the final infection ratios smaller than the giant component size Gm (the 
maximum number of susceptible phones that the virus can infect). This not only 
tells us that low attack frequencies will decrease the final infection ratio and even 
stop the virus at its initial stage, but again reminds us of the important 
countermeasure to protect the communication system: improve our monitoring 
capacity to detect the virus early or force the virus to use a low-attack frequency. 
 
 
Figure 6. The MMS volume created by the temporal viral spread of 
MMS viruses where the red, green and dashed lines correspond 
respectively to the results with market share m=0.03, m=0.30 and the 
detection threshold. The inset shows the epidemic curves for market 
share m=0.03 and m=0.30 cases. 
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 An important question we would like to answer is whether MMS viruses 
could infect most susceptible users without being detected by the phone operator. It 
is obvious that the smaller the average attack period, the faster the virus spreads 
but that would make it very easily detectable. For large market shares such as 
m=0.30, we perform the following experiments, we first set the parameters 
s(maximum attack number)=50, ρ(random-attack probability)=0.1, p(effective-
scanning probability)=0.25 and T(average attack period)=2.5 day. We find that the 
virus can infect about one million users in about one year and the MMS volume 
created by the viruses is well below the threshold volume of being detected. That 
means that given enough time it can infect a large fraction of susceptible phones 
without being found. For a small market share m=0.03, we set the parameters 
s(maximum attack number)=1000, ρ(random attack probability)=0.3, p(effect 
scanning probability)=0.25 and T(average attack period)=2 hour. We find the virus 
can infect 0.14 million susceptible users in one year and the MMS volume resulted 
by the viruses exceeds the threshold of being detected (see Figure 6). This is 
because the small market-share of susceptible phones results in the low efficiency 
of attacks.  
From the results above, we see that a virus can infect a large number of users 
in a stealth mode. They can later make the infected phones perform some simple 
malicious functions, such as sending short text messages to get the communication 
channels jammed – a typical denial-of-service attack. On the other hand, we 
demonstrate the effectiveness of anomaly detection schemes in detecting the virus 
or forcing the virus to spread very slowly, providing the phone operators with a 
guide to put in place proper countermeasures. 
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4. Conclusions and Discussions: 
We studied the interplay between topological and scanning behaviors of 
MMS viruses. For a small market share with no giant component existing in the 
call graph, the addition of random scans can significantly increase the possibility of 
an epidemic outbreak. For a large market share with a giant component in the call 
graph, the addition of random scans can only slowly increase the number of 
infected phones or even drive the virus to stop itself. We also find that given 
enough time, some viruses can infect a large fraction of susceptible phones without 
being detected by phone operators. Fortunately, independent of MMS viruses’ 
attack strategies, the epidemics can still be limited by the OS market share and 
smart anomaly detection schemes. Added to a good understanding of the network 
formed from connections between users, smart anomaly detection schemes may be 
able to prevent mobile phones to become the next platform for virus writers hence 
avoiding the situation typical in computer systems where virus writers seem to be 
winning the battle. 
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